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Abstract
Instant messaging applications are increasingly claiming to offer end-to-end
encryption. Yet actual, user perspectives on the necessity, appropriateness,
and desirability of such “secure apps” are poorly understood. This work
considers two user surveys on university students, and focusing on both
user perspectives and claimed level of security understanding for three secure
instant messaging apps – Signal Private Messenger, the Secret Conversation
feature of Facebook Messenger, and Crypho. The first survey maps the
students’ knowledge of secure instant messaging and common usage of these
apps, while the second survey takes a closer look at the awareness and practices
among those students who have used at least one of the target applications.
Keywords: End-to-end encryption, secure instant messaging, Signal,
Secret Conversation for Facebook Messenger, Crypho, Signal protocol, Crypho
protocol.
1 Introduction
Mass surveillance of digital communications has become a major privacy concern in
our society. End-to-end (E2E) encryption in mobile instant messaging apps provides
confidentiality between users, protecting communication against eavesdropping as
well as the mass surveillance capabilities of telecom operators and even nation-state
actors. Ideally, users should not have to trust any network entity or third party.
However, it is not clear that users are aware of the security guarantees of the apps
they use, or even if they deem such guarantees to be important. This gap in mapping
the user population is especially critical with regards to young generations, who are
both technologically aware and will use messaging applications for a far greater
proportion of their lifetimes than preceding generations.
To address this issue, we conduct two user surveys, based on a university
student populace, about secure instant messaging and applications offering the
service. The first survey is intended to map the target group’s knowledge on
secure instant messaging, while the second survey contains more in-depth questions
on the three secure instant messaging applications (Signal Private Messenger, the
Secret Conversation feature of Facebook Messenger, and Crypho). From a user’s
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point of view, the second survey aims to answer the research questions of which
application is best and most trustworthy. Both surveys consist of questions with
multiple choice options. Our target group is students at Norwegian University of
Science and Technology (NTNU) Gløshaugen, which serves as the population basis
of these surveys. Samples are drawn from this population, with a sample size of
96 in the first survey and 42 in the second survey. While these sample sizes are
relatively small, they are sufficient for the statistical analyses we consider in this
paper. Ultimately our results indicate certain trends in user understanding and app
usage which are important to the development of security apps – these results are
unbiased (for academic purposes only). Furthermore, this work paves the way for
future user studies on a larger scale.
Survey 1 goals: are designed to discover the population’s awareness on secure
instant messaging.
Goal 1.1: Analyse the use of secure messaging apps vs. the desire for privacy.
Goal 1.2: Analyse the use of secure messaging apps vs. the understanding of End-
to-End (E2E) encryption.
Goal 1.3: Analyse understanding of message privacy.
Goal 1.4: Analyse if secure applications are uniformly used for to communicate with
different groups (friends, family, etc.)
Goal 1.5: Compare the popularity among applications.
Survey 2 goals: have more in-depth questions about three secure instant
messaging applications Signal Private Messenger, the Secret Conversation feature of
Facebook Messenger, and Crypho. The survey assumes that the population has used
at least one of the applications. For simplicity, we refer to the Secret Conversation
feature of Facebook Messanger as “Facebook Messanger”, but note that the security
properties are stronger under this feature.
Goal 2.1: Compare popularity of applications. Is Crypho more popular, being based
in Norway? Compare users’ preferences in secure instant messaging applications.
Goal 2.2: Analyse users’ trust in secure instant messaging applications.
Goal 2.3: Analyse users’ app preference with respect to communication with
different groups (friends, family, etc.)
Goal 2.4: Analyse the use and trust of the secure messaging apps vs. the
understanding of E2E encryption.
In the analyses of the surveys, statistical tests were used to form conclusions
about all NTNU students at Gløshaugen – students studying for degrees in
technology, science, engineering, etc. The first survey assessed students’ knowledge
on secure instant messaging, E2E encryption, and mapped their use of secure
applications. An interesting result from the first survey is that students care more
about others not being able to read all of their messages, than keeping their messages
private (Analysis 1.f [Cha]). Although the students do not like others to read all of
their messages, few of them actually use a secure instant messaging application
several times a day (Analysis 1.d). Approximately half of all NTNU students
at Gløshaugen are familiar with the terms “E2E encryption” and “secure instant
messaging” (Analyses 1.a and 1.e, respectively).
The analyses of the second survey emphasise that Signal and the Secret
Conversation feature of Facebook Messenger were used equally for personal
communication with friends (Analysis 2.b). However, Signal was used more
for personal communication with family than the Secret Conversation feature of
Facebook Messenger (Analysis 2.h). Where there is insufficient data to draw
inferences about the population, we summarize the responses for the sample group.
This applies to the use of Crypho and user perspectives on which application is most
trustworthy.
For full details on survey questions, responses, and analyses see [Cha].
Outline In the following sections we compare the relevant apps (§2), and address
the survey methods and data collection(§3). Using the survey results, we address
the analysis goals (§4).
2 Comparison of the Apps
We consider three secure instant messaging apps: Signal Private Messenger (Signal),
the Secret Conversation feature of Facebook Messenger, and Crypho [Cha]. These
applications claim to offer E2E encryption. They differ on how the private messages
are encrypted. Signal and Facebook Messenger encrypt messages using the Signal
protocol [CGCD+16]. Crypho uses the Crypho protocol for E2E encryption of
messages [Cry].
“Signal” is the name of both an instant messaging application called Signal
Private Messenger, and an E2E encryption protocol called Signal protocol. Open
Whisper Systems invented both the application and the protocol. The Signal
application is a successor of the encrypted voice calling application Redphone,
and the instant messaging application TextSecure. Redphone and TextSecure were
merged into one application and renamed Signal in November 2015 [Opeb, FMB+16].
Signal offers the services text messaging between two users, group chat between
several users, voice/video call between two users, and the uploading of attachments
for text messaging and group chat.
The Signal protocol has two phases to send alternately encrypted and
authenticated messages back and forth [Opea]. The first phase is an initial phase
where the first message is the key agreement to find a shared session key between
two parties, called the Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH) key agreement
protocol. The second phase is for subsequent messages, and called the Double
Ratchet algorithm. In this phase, the established session key from the first message
is reused. Thus, the session key will update for every message exchange to achieve
forward secrecy, as performed by the ratcheting technique [CGCD+16]. Extensive
operations happen in the key agreement for the first message, and it is more efficient
to reuse the established session key for later messages. This is why they call the
Signal protocol a “two phase” stateful protocol.
The Signal protocol combines the X3DH key agreement protocol followed by
the Double Ratchet algorithm. Curve25519 is used for the Triple Diffie–Hellman (3-
DH) key agreement handshake with pre-key pairs in the X3DH protocol [CGCD+16,
FMB+16]. Messages are encrypted with AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
and authenticated using Hash Message Authentication Code–Secure Hash Algorithm
256-bit (HMAC-SHA256). Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithms based on
Twisted Edwards curves (XEdDSA) is used as digital signature scheme to sign the
public pre-key.
Many people have signed up for a Facebook account. Thus, the application that
Facebook delivers with message functionality is widely used. Facebook Messenger is
a standalone application that a user can install on her device, as long as she has a
Facebook account. As for Signal, Facebook Messenger also uses the Signal protocol
for E2E encryption.
Facebook Messenger does not provide E2E encryption by default. Users must
initiate E2E encryption by enabling the feature Secret Conversation with the
intended recipient. The recipient also has to initiate a Secret Conversation back
to the initiator. Hence the recipient will not receive the message from the initiator
unless the recipient initiates a Secret Conversation back with the initiator. This
only applies to the first message exchanged; for subsequent messages the recipient
receives the initiator’s messages encrypted. If a user changes her device, she again
needs to initiate a Secret Conversation with the same recipient. This is consistent
for Signal too, since private keys are generated and derived on the device [Fac]. The
private keys never leave the device. The Secret Conversation feature of Facebook
Messenger are limited to text messaging and the uploading of attachments between
two users.
Crypho is an application designed by a Norwegian privately held company
building technical solutions for secure and private communication, intended for
organizations. More than 70 countries use Crypho, with user groups including
financial institutions, journalists, lawyers, governments, software companies, and
human rights activists1. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used as a standard
encryption on the transport layer for device-server communication, and Crypho uses
additional security primitives as well to encrypt messages E2E on the application
layer.
The Crypho protocol’s goal is to E2E encrypt messages, file shares, group chats,
and voice/video calls for a person or an organisation. The Crypho protocol uses
encryption algorithms like AES with 256-bit keys in Counter with Cipher Block
Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CCM) mode, ElGamal Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC), and scrypt to encrypt messages [Cry]. Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used as the digital signature scheme. A user’s
private keys are stored encrypted on the server. To obtain the encrypted private
keys, a user uses a passphrase. The passphrase is never communicated to the server
or stored on the user’s device. This gives a user the advantage of obtaining her
encrypted private keys from the server, decrypt her private keys with the passphrase,
and accessing her message history on multiple devices.
Further details on the apps and protocols can be found at [Cha].
3 Survey Method and Data Collection
Both surveys are distributed and shared with students at the Department of
Information Security and Communication Technology (IIK) and the Department
of Computer Science (IDI) by email. Recruitment also consisted of talking to
students in the canteens, at students’ offices, in the hallway, association offices,
data laboratories, etc.
For the second survey, an additional email distribution was made using the
“shared message channel” at NTNU [NTN]. NTNU sent the surveys to 500 students
at the Faculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering (IE). The
1See, e.g. Enterprise Mobile Chat and File-Sharing with End-to-End Encryption. Available at
https://appadvice.com.
ITEMIZE Hacker Club at IIK was also contacted to review and test the applications,
resulting in nine sample points. Survey responses were collected in the period from
February 12th to March 30th, 2017.
At NTNU Gløshaugen there are 13164 students [Nor]. Overall, 96 participants
(64 males, 32 females) took part in the first online survey using Google Forms2. It
consisted of 15 questions and lasted about 5 minutes to complete. The participants
were a random sample of technical NTNU students at Gløshaugen. There were no
requirements for participating in the first survey. One participant was 35-44, 22
participants were 25-34, and the remaining 73 participants were 18-24 years old.
Participants are mostly from Norway (87), and the remaining participants are from
other countries (9).
Furthermore, the second survey has 42 responses (33 males, 9 females) from
students at Gløshaugen. It consisted of 27 questions and lasted about 10 minutes
to complete. The participant space for the two surveys may overlap or be disjoint.
In the second survey, the population is the same as for the first survey. The second
survey is also collected online with Google Forms. This is a combination of a random
sample of 33 respondents of the population and 9 ITEMIZE-respondents who tested
the applications. All 42 respondents are considered as a random sample of technical
NTNU students at Gløshaugen. As a requirement for participation in the second
survey, respondents must have used at least one of the three applications.
In the second survey, 27 participants were 18-24 years old, and the remaining 15
participants were 25-34 years old. Participants are mostly from Norway (38), and
the remaining participants are from other countries (4).
Survey 1 questions:
1. How often do you use text messaging (on your phone or tablet)?
2. How important is it for you to keep your text messages private?
3. How important is it for you that others can not read all of your text messages?
4. Have you heard about “secure instant messaging”?
5. Do you know what "end-to-end encryption" means?
6. Which of these applications have you heard about?
7. Which of these applications have you ever used?
8. What have you used the application(s) for?
9. How often do you use text messaging with a secure application?
Survey 2 questions:
1. Have you heard about the Secret Conversation feature of Facebook Messenger?
2. Which of these applications are you currently using and how often?
7. I trust the end-to-end security of the application.
9. Signal Private Messenger: What have you used the application for?
10. Signal Private Messenger: What do you like about it?
13. If you use Facebook Messenger, do you usually start a Secret Conversation
with the intended recipient?
14. Facebook Messenger + Secret Conversation: What have you used the
application for?
15. Facebook Messenger + Secret Conversation: What do you like about it?
17. Crypho: What have you used the application for?
18. Crypho: What do you like about it?
2https://www.google.com/forms
20. Which application do you like best?
We omit questions from the second survey for which the number of responses
did not provide meaningful data, for example question number 3, etc. The survey
questions are designed to use simple language, instead of more well-defined security
terminology. In particular, Survey 1 Question 2 and Question 3 will bear strong
similarities for an informed reader, but are designed to detect a potential lack of
user understanding in the meaning of “message privacy” (confidentiality).
As explained in Appendix A there are conditions that must be satisfied in order
to make statistical inferences about the population; these conditions include minimal
sample sizes. To analyse the statistical results of both surveys, 1-proportion z-test,
2-proportion z-test, 1-proportion confidence interval, and 2-proportion confidence
interval are used. An overview of all statistical test results from both surveys is
given in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Overview of analyses from the first survey
Analysis Related Test Result
question(s)
1.a) 5 1-prop. z-test H1: p > 0.50
1.b) 3 1-prop. conf. interval 0.39 < p < 0.59
1.c) 1 1-prop. z-test H1: p > 0.60
1.d) 9 1-prop. z-test H1: p < 0.25
1.e) 4 1-prop. conf. interval 0.37 < p < 0.57
1.f) 2, 3 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
1.g) 6 1-prop. z-test H1: p > 0.50
1.h) 7 1-prop. z-test Inconclusive1.
H0: p = 0.50
1.i) 8 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
1This is not a result. There was insufficient evidence to change the initial assumption H0.
Table 2: Overview of analyses from the second survey
Analysis Related Test Result
question(s)
2.a) 7 1-prop. conf. interval 0.37 < p < 0.68
2.b) 9, 14 2-prop. z-test Inconclusive.
H0: p1 − p2 = 0
2.c) 9, 14, 17 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
2.d) 7 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
2.e) 20 2-prop. z-test Inconclusive.
H0: p1 − p2 = 0
2.f) 20 2-prop. conf. interval -0.03 < p1 − p2 < 0.37
2.g) 1 1-prop. conf. interval 0.37 < p < 0.68
2.h) 9, 14 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
2.i) 10, 15, 18 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 02
2.j) 15, 18 2-prop. z-test H1: p1 − p2 > 0
2H1 only applies to the comparison of Signal and Crypho. Since the comparison of Signal and
Facebook Messenger must continue to assume H0.
4 Results
Full statistical analyses for quantitatively analysing the survey results can be found
at [Cha]. Here we apply the survey analyses to the stated goals in §1. We use a
significance level of α = 0.05 throughout.
Goal 1.1
Goal 1.1 is linked to Analyses 1.b, 1.c, and 1.d. More than 60% of all NTNU
Gløshaugen students use text messaging several times a day (p-value=0.0392), and
less than 25% of all NTNU Gløshaugen students use text messaging with a secure
application several times a day (p-value=0.0047). Between 39% and 59% of all
NTNU students at Gløshaugen think it is important for them that others cannot
read all of their text messages (95% confidence level). The percentage of how many
students that use a secure messaging application is lower than the percentage that
does not like others to read all of their messages. Thus, there is a discrepancy
between use of secure messaging and the perceived importance of it.
Goal 1.2
Goal 1.2 is collected in Analyses 1.a, 1.d and 1.e. There is sufficient evidence to
believe that more than 50% of all NTNU students at Gløshaugen know what E2E
encryption means (p-value=0.0021). While less than 25% of all NTNU students
at Gløshaugen use secure instant messaging several times a day (p-value=0.0047,
Figure 1). Between 37% and 57% of all NTNU students have heard about secure
instant messaging (95% confidence level). As a result, more students are familiar
with the terms “E2E encryption” and “secure instant messaging”, than the students
who actually use secure instant messaging several times a day.
Figure 1: The response distribution from Question 9 from the first survey.
Goal 1.3
Questions 2 and 3 are reasonably similar but formulated differently. A uniform
response distribution was expected from Questions 2 to 3, but the result is divergent.
Students were not consistent in their answers; many of them changed their answer
from Questions 2 to 3 observed in the raw data sample. Therefore, the Analysis 1.f
is conducted to compare the observations, and our reasoning is that students are
more concerned that others cannot read all of their messages, than keeping their
messages private (p-value=0.0495).
Figure 2: The response distribution on Question 2 from the first survey, where
number “1” means “Not important at all”, and “5” means “Extremely important”.
Figure 3: The response distribution on Question 3 from the first survey. Compared
to Figure 2 we see the noticeable difference in the response distribution for the
alternatives “4” and “5”.
Goal 1.4
From the raw data, more students use a secure application with friends than with
family. Therefore Analysis 1.i compares if students are communicating more with
friends than family with a secure application. From the 2-proportion test in Analysis
1.i, we can assume that more students use a secure application to communicate with
their friends than family (p-value=0.0005).
Goal 1.5
In Analysis 1.g over 50% of all NTNU students at Gløshaugen have heard about
Hangouts (p-value=0.0021), iMessage (p-value=0), Viber (p-value=0.0122) and
WhatsApp (p-value=0). From the sample of students, the three applications
considered in the second survey, Signal Private Messenger, Facebook Messenger
with Secret Conversation, and Crypho were not among the popular applications.
Goal 2.1
There were insufficient responses to make statistical inferences about the whole
population, because the number of responses does not fulfil the conditions required.
We can see a trend in survey responses in for example Question 2, none of the
sampled students answered that they are using Crypho several times a day (Figure
4).
Figure 4: The response distribution on Question 2 from the second survey. App use
scales from left to right, where dark blue implies regular app use and purple implies
little app use. Light blue corresponds to never using the app.
No tests are conducted for students’ use of Crypho, because the response
proportion for the population’s use of Crypho did not fulfil the statistical test
conditions.
One test is possible to perform on Crypho data, which compares if the proportion
of students that have never used Crypho is greater than the proportion that have
never used Signal or Facebook Messenger. We can assume that the proportion of
students that have never used Crypho is greater than the proportion that have never
used Signal (p-value=0.0005) or Facebook Messenger (p-value=0.0009), as tested in
Analysis 2.c.
We conclude that students like Signal and Facebook Messenger equally (95%
confidence level), based on Analysis 2.f. Since 0 is in the interval, it is possible that
p1 − p2 = 0, and there is no difference between the rating of Signal and Facebook
Messenger. There were 3 students in the sampled responses that rated Crypho as
best, which is an insufficient number of responses to make inferences about the whole
population.
The comparison of which application that is the easiest to use (Analyses 2.i and
2.j), shows that all NTNU students at Gløshaugen think Signal (p-value=0) and
Facebook Messenger (p-value=0) are easier to use than Crypho.
Goal 2.2
The analysis of students’ trust in the E2E encryption of Signal is conducted in
Analysis 2.a. Between 37% and 68% of all NTNU students at Gløshaugen trust
Signal (95% confidence level). The sample size was insufficient to make statistical
inferences about the whole populations’ trust of Facebook Messenger’s and Crypho’s
E2E encryption.
In the sample, 22 students trust Signal, and only 9 students trust Facebook
Messenger. The raw data shows diverging trends since both Signal and Facebook
Messenger use the Signal protocol for E2E encryption. A possible theory is that the
sample students do not have knowledge about the E2E encryption protocol behind
Signal and Facebook Messenger.
Figure 5: The response distribution on Question 7 from the second survey. App
trust scales from left to right, where dark blue implies strongly agree in app trust
and purple implies strongly disagree in app trust. Light blue corresponds to never
using the app.
Goal 2.3
Analysis 2.h tests if more students use Signal than Facebook Messenger to
communicate with their family. There is a sufficient evidence to conclude that all
NTNU students at Gløshaugen use Signal more than they use Facebook Messenger
to communicate with their family (p-value=0.0281).
Goal 2.4
The piece-wise comparison in Analysis 2.d shows that the proportion of NTNU
Gløshaugen students claiming knowledge of E2E encryption is higher than the
proportion claiming trust in the E2E encryption of Signal (p-value of 0.0057),
Facebook Messenger (p-value=0), and Crypho (p-value=0).
Analysis 2.g covers Question 1, with the result that the proportion of all NTNU
students at Gløshaugen that have heard about and used Facebook Messenger
with Secret Conversation is between 37% and 68% (95% confidence level). From
Question 13, only 3 students in the sample answered that they regularly start a
Secret Conversation with the intended recipient when they use Facebook Messenger.
Although there were insufficient responses to make inferences about the whole
population, we can see a trend in the survey responses that if the sampled students
use Facebook Messenger, they are seldom starting a Secret Conversation with the
intended recipient.
Figure 6: The response distribution on Question 20 from the second survey, where
“1” implies first choice, “2” implies second choice, and “3” implies third choice.
5 Conclusion
Ultimately, these results provide an insight into user preferences for secure
applications and awareness of E2E encryption. We note that most students appear
aware of these terms, and user preference tends toward Signal and Facebook
Messenger with Secret Conversations over Crypho, despite the latter being a
Norwegian company and hence a “local” company for the surveyed population.
Finally, we note that although confidentiality is considered important by many
students, far fewer act on that tenet by using secure messaging. App usability,
in the context of ISO 9241-11 [usa] extends the analysis questions we address in this
work, including efficiency and overall user experience. We leave this for future work.
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A Appendix: Assumptions and Conditions
To analyse the statistical results of both surveys, different tests are performed.
Consequently, it is necessary to check if a test can be applied by assuring that
certain conditions are fulfilled.
Satisfy Randomness
In order to perform the statistical analysis, both surveys must satisfy a randomness
condition. Randomness is defined to be an equal chance of selecting any student of
the population. Emails were sent to all students at IIK and IDI, and every student
that received the email was equally likely to answer the surveys. Surveys were shared
by email for the second time, and NTNU sent emails to 500 randomly selected
students at IE. The sample is not representative of all students at Gløshaugen that
may affect the results. The sample is considered as sufficiently representative, since
NTNU students at Gløshaugen are mainly technical students.
For those students recruited in person on the entire Gløshaugen campus area,
each of them was equally likely to answer the surveys. The recruitment is
representative of the population, since students were recruited in canteens, students’
offices, hallways, association offices, data laboratories etc. from different buildings
at Gløshaugen. Willing students received a piece of paper with link to the surveys.
Thus, the recruitment is assumed to be a random sample from all students at
Gløshaugen.
The ITEMIZE group is a non-random subgroup that could affect the analysis
results. However, in the interest of making inferences on the population, they are
treated as random with the rest of the sample. They are also technical students at
Gløshaugen, and likely to have used the applications like other respondents.
For both surveys this conclusion of randomness will apply to all the tests from
here on.
1-Proportion Z-Test
Following conditions are needed for 1-proportion z-test [Ste]:
• The sample of the population must be randomly selected.
• The sample must be less than 10% of the population.
• And the sample size must be large enough:
n · p and n · (1− p) ≥ 10 for a significance test.
• Calculation of the z-test statistic value:
z =
pˆ− p√
p(1−p)
n
2-Proportion Z-Test
Following conditions are needed for 2-proportion z-test [Ste]:
• The two samples must be independent and randomly selected.
• The sample size must be large enough:
n1 · pˆc and n1 · (1− pˆc) ≥ 5 and
n2 · pˆc and n2 · (1− pˆc) ≥ 5 for a significance test.
• Calculation of the z-test statistic value:
z =
pˆ1 − pˆ2√
pˆc(1−pˆc)
n1
+ pˆc(1−pˆc)
n2
where pˆc =
x1 + x2
n1 + n2
1-Proportion Confidence Interval
Conditions to calculate confidence interval [Ste]:
• The sample of the population must be randomly selected.
• The sample must be less than 10% of the population.
• And the sample size must be large enough:
n · pˆ and n(1− pˆ) ≥ 10 for a confidence interval.
• Calculation of the confidence interval estimation:
pˆ± z∗
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
n
2-Proportion Confidence Interval
Following conditions are needed for 2-proportion z-test [Ste]:
• The two samples must be independent and randomly selected.
• The sample size must be large enough:
n1 · pˆ1 and n1 · (1− pˆ1) ≥ 5 and
n2 · pˆ2 and n2 · (1− pˆ2) ≥ 5 for a confidence interval.
• Calculation of the z-test statistic value:
pˆ1 − pˆ2 ± z∗
√
pˆ1(1− pˆ1)
n1
+
pˆ2(1− pˆ2)
n2
